The first judicial divorce in what is now Canada was granted in Nova Scotia in 1750. Since then, Canadian divorce law has undergone significant change, going from independent provincial rules to a modern federal system based on the breakdown of a marriage.
Yet one thing has remained a consistent challenge throughout this evolution, and that is the intersection of religion within civil family law.
For many Canadians, marriage is both a legal and religious institution. While couples often sign the legal paperwork and participate in a civil marriage process, for the religious community, it is the religious ceremony that holds the most meaning. The civil marriage may be necessary for the Canadian government, but the religious ceremony is what marks the beginning of married life. The same distinction can arise when a relationship ends. A civil divorce can legally dissolve the marriage, but it may not be enough for someone whose faith also requires a religious divorce.
This creates a difficult question for the courts: how can a secular legal system respond to the consequences of religious divorce without becoming involved in religious doctrine? The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bruker v. Marcovitz provided one answer.
The Facts
In Bruker, a Jewish couple entered into a separation agreement where the husband agreed to give his wife a get, a religious divorce recognized under Jewish law. He then refused to do so for fifteen years.
The consequences were significant.
Although the parties had been civilly divorced in 1981, the wife could not remarry within the Jewish tradition without the get, and it is nearly impossible for her to obtain one unless her husband agrees to give it to her. If she remarried without a get, the marriage would not be recognized under Jewish law, and any children from that union could be considered mamzerim (children born outside a valid marriage), a status that would severely restrict their ability to marry within the Jewish faith. She eventually brought a claim seeking damages for the husband’s failure to follow through on his promise and give her a religious divorce.
The husband argued that since the agreement involved a religious obligation, enforcing it would infringe his freedom of religion.
What the Supreme Court Said
The Supreme Court disagreed, and its reasoning would affect the intersection of religion and civil law for years to follow.
The majority held that just because a contract contains or refers to religious matters does not mean it constitutes a religious practice protected by the Charter’s right to freedom of religion and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
The Court found that the husband’s promise formed part of a valid separation agreement and could be enforced like any other contractual obligation. The Court was not being asked to interpret Jewish law or grant a religious divorce. Rather, they were being asked to determine whether a person had breached a contractual promise and caused harm as a result.
In dissent, the minority emphasized state neutrality toward religion, arguing that courts should not intervene in religious precepts. The minority also argued that the agreement lacked jurisdiction because neither consenting to nor obtaining a religious divorce produced civil consequences, and awarding damages would therefore enforce a religious rule rather than apply secular family-law principles.
Perhaps the most important part of the Court’s analysis is that it rejected the idea that freedom of religion automatically shields a person from the legal consequences of breaking a voluntary agreement. Religious freedom is a fundamental Charter value, a contract is a contract, and sometimes religious freedom must be balanced against competing interests, including equality, autonomy, and fairness.
Why the Case Still Matters Today
Nearly twenty years later, Bruker is still incredibly relevant.
Family courts continue to encounter situations where religious barriers to remarriage can affect a person’s ability to move on with their life. While cases surrounding the refusal to give a get in the Jewish tradition are the most discussed examples, courts have also faced disputes involving Islamic divorces and other religious traditions where a civil divorce alone may not free a person from their marriage.
Part of the reason that Bruker is still referenced and relied upon today is that it established a broader principle: courts can address the civil consequences of religious practices without deciding religious questions themselves.
When a religious obligation becomes intertwined with a legally binding agreement or is used as a form of leverage in family law proceedings, courts have the ability intervene through ordinary secular legal principles such as contract law, public policy, or procedural remedies.
In that sense, Bruker is not really about Judaism. It’s about how Canadian law balances religious freedom with the need to protect individuals from coercion and unfairness.
The Ongoing Challenge
Canadian courts like to tiptoe around the religious world. They cannot grant religious divorces, interpret theology, or act as religious tribunals. They cannot force a husband to give a get, nor can they force a wife to return her mahr, unless they are able to find a secular component attached to the issue in which they can enforce it through.
At the same time, the courts cannot ignore the real-world effects that religious barriers may have on divorcing spouses.
Bruker illustrates the balancing act at the heart of modern family law: respecting religious freedom while ensuring that religion is not used as a tool of control within the civil justice system.
More than 275 years after Canada’s first recorded divorce, that balancing act remains one of the most complex and fascinating intersections between religion and family law.
This blog post was written by Alison Boyce, the Practice Lead of the Family Law team and Carly Baldachin, Articling Student. Alison can be reached at 613-566-2081 or at [email protected].